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ABSTRACT
It is not easy to understand why some African party systems manage
to stabilise while others remain fluid. This article argues that
institutional choices made during democratic transition impact
the likelihood of party system stabilisation. The experiences of
Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles are
compared; despite sharing many similarities (insularity, smallness,
low ethnic diversity, authoritarian past, economic vulnerability and
competitive elections), they differ substantively in terms of the
patterns of interparty competition. It is shown that stabilisation is
likely if party elites are able to control the rules of the game
during the transition to democracy. A strategic choice of the party
law, electoral system and executive system helps structure
interactions over time and reduce uncertainty in electoral
competition. The findings highlight the need to further explore
the ‘black box’ of democratic transitions, and the role of agency in
political outcomes in Africa.
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Over a quarter century has elapsed since the third wave of democracy spread to sub-
Saharan Africa. In most countries, multiparty elections are now the regular procedure
for electing the government, even when significant problems of integrity arise (Norris
and Grömping 2019). Party systems emerging from these elections vary considerably in
terms of the degree of stabilisation or institutionalisation (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001;
Basedau 2007; Lindberg 2007; Ferree 2010; Riedl 2014; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014;
Kuenzi et al. 2017; Sanches 2018).
The most compelling explanations for this variation emphasise the long-term impact of
authoritarian legacies (LeBas 2011; Riedl 2014) and the structure of social cleavages and
ethnic coalitions (Ferree 2010; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014). While political institutions
seem to be less influential (Ferree 2010; Riedl 2014), some findings should be noted. Pro-
portional representation (PR) formulas and presidentialism tend to produce higher levels
of institutionalisation (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014; Sanches 2018), as do stricter rules on
party switching (Goeke and Hartmann 2011) and access to public funding (Sanches 2018).
Although these studies shed light on the effects of political institutions on party system
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development, the question of why certain institutions are chosen over others remains
under-researched.
This article argues that institutional choices made during democratic transition impact
party systems stabilisation over time. Democratic ‘transitions are delimited, on the one
side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on
the other, by the installation of some form of democracy’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter
1986, 6). They therefore represent a critical juncture of party formation and institutional
crafting during which party elites seek to minimise the odds of losing power (Colomer
2001). The choices made at this point will influence the kind of competition that will
emerge in the future, even if they are confronted with high levels of uncertainty (Lupu
and Riedl 2013, 1344).
Politics in Africa is often defined in terms of informal institutions but many studies have
demonstrated the key role played by party laws, electoral systems and executive systems
in electoral competition (van Cranenburgh 2003; Lindberg 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007;
Goeke and Hartmann 2011). Adding to these findings, this study argues that, when choos-
ing institutions, party elites try to anticipate some of their effects by selecting those that
best protect their interests.
These arguments are tested through an in-depth comparative study of four cases –
Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles; despite some similarities
(insularity, smallness, low ethnic diversity, authoritarian past, economic vulnerability,
competitive elections), their patterns of interparty competition differ substantively
(more stable in Cabo Verde and Seychelles and more fluid in Comoros and São Tomé
and Príncipe). Arguably, different sets of contextual, contigent and structural factors
affect party system development (Riedl 2014; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014; Sanches
2018), but focusing on most similar cases, while keeping extraneous variance constant,
reveals the importance of institutional choices made during transition. Thus, the empiri-
cal analysis starts by depicting the choices made during transition, before discussing how
the choices structured competition over time.
The analysis follows the logic of descriptive inference since it seeks to demonstrate the
existence of links between choices and effects, focusing on strategic institutional choices
as key causal mechanisms. The study contributes to the theory of party system develop-
ment by highlighting the relevance of transitions and party elite agency. The literature on
small state politics is also advanced by showing that politics is not always beautiful in
smaller jurisdictions (Anckar 2008). The variations in constitutional and institutional
design in small states (Poupko 2017) can further our understanding of politics in larger
states (Veenendaal and Corbett 2015).
The article starts with a literature review on party system development in Africa and dis-
cusses why institutional choices made during transition to democracy matter. The ration-
ale of case selection is then explained before describing the degree of stability of each
party system. The main empirical section characterises the context of democratic tran-
sition and how party elites selected party laws, electoral systems and the system of gov-
ernment. A discussion of the differences and commonalities across cases follows to shed
more light on the link between choices and consequences. The final section summarises
the main findings and sets out the implications for further research on party system devel-
opment in Africa.
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2. Understanding party systems in Africa: why democratic transitions still
matter?
Party systems are the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition (Sartori
1976) but there is little consensus on which indicators best describe these interactions.
Scholars have gone from counting the number of relevant parties (Laakso and Taagepera
1979; Duverger 1959), to trying to measure the degree to which party systems are institu-
tionalised (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Institutionalisation and its dimensions have been
measured variously in studies spanning all regions in the world, but stability has come to
be considered its most relevant dimension (Casal Bértoa 2018; Mainwaring 2018). It
expresses the extent to which a stable set of parties interact in relatively stable ways
over time (Mainwaring 2018).
African party systems have been classified in terms of the number of relevant parties
(Bogaards 2004; Salih and Nordlund 2007), the degree of institutionalisation (Kuenzi and
Lambright 2001; Basedau 2007; Osei 2013; Riedl 2014; Sanches 2018) and stability (Lind-
berg 2007; Ferree 2010; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014; Kuenzi et al. 2017). These studies
all show a striking variation in the level of stability or institutionalisation of party
systems, with countries like Botswana, Cabo Verde, Namibia and South Africa displaying
higher levels of stability and rootedness in society than Zambia, Comoros or Benin, for
example.
A handful of studies have investigated the sources of this variation. Ferree (2010)
demonstrated that instability increased when no ethnic group was able to form a
minimum winning coalition (MWC). Riedl (2014) argued that the incumbent’s control
over the transition process mattered more for party system institutionalisation than colo-
nial background, type of electoral system, state of the economy or the strength of social
cleavages. Following Ferree (2010), Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) confirmed that MWC
decreased levels of stability, and this was also the case in former French colonies and
countries where the colonisation had come to an end sooner. My recent work highlights
factors related to both path-dependency (transition mode) and agency (strategic choice of
institutions and party building strategies) to explain variation in levels of institutionalisa-
tion (Sanches 2018).
The role of political institutions is less obvious. Contrary to conventional wisdom (van
de Walle 2003), presidentialism appears to have little (Ferree 2010) or no effect on institu-
tionalisation (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014); and ‘greater proportionality increases vola-
tility rather than reducing it as it does in many other regions.’ (Weghorst and Bernhard
2014, 1730). In contrast, anti-defection laws (Goeke and Hartmann 2011), provision of
public funding, and programmatic linkages favour institutionalisation (Sanches 2018).
Within this literature, not much is known about why party elites choose one type of
institution over the other, particularly during critical junctures such as the transitions to
democracy. But exploring this context further sheds light on electoral competition in
Africa. First, critical junctures produce ‘overwhelming mandates for policy and/or structural
change’ and ‘are seen as resulting in the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement
from amongst alternatives’ (Hogan and Doyle 2009, 4). Therefore, they ‘set the tone for
what comes in their wake’ (Ibid.). The transition stage is often seen as a critical juncture
as it ‘coincides with the breaking of the previous power monopoly and with the formative
period for the new political movements’; therefore, we can expect ‘that it will have a
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significant impact in shaping the new parties (party unit level) and relations among parties
(party system level)’ (Cotta 1996, 73). Second, political institutions set the rules of the game
and, as such, create incentives for political actors to preserve rules that are beneficial to
them or alter those which are unfavourable (Colomer 2001). Even when confronted
with high levels of uncertainty (Lupu and Riedl 2013), party elites make strategic decisions
on the basis of the available information.
In most African countries, transition to multipartyism opened a window of opportunity
for institutional crafting. The broad spectrum of variation in party laws ranges from more
restrictive laws – that proscribe political parties and protect the interests of existing parties
– to more permissive laws – that set minimal requirements for party activities and seek to
promote representation (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 103–119). Party elites can also choose
the electoral rules that will increase their chances of being elected. It has been shown that
political configurations dominated by few parties are inclined to establish majority rules,
which ‘tend to produce a single, absolute winner and subsequent absolute losers’,
whereas multiparty systems are more likely to opt for proportional representation
systems which in principle ‘create multiple partial winners and far fewer total losers
than majority rules’ (Colomer 2005, 2). Besides the electoral formula, other elements
such as assembly size, district magnitude, ballot structure and electoral thresholds, can
influence the degree of proportionality of an election, how many parties are elected
and the likelihood of single party governments (Lijphart 1994).
Finally, the choice of the executive system is critical for cabinet formation and stability.
In presidential systems, a strong executive power, with full control of cabinet composition,
is elected for a fixed term and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence and
can only be removed in extreme circumstances (Linz 1990). The party that elects the pre-
sident is in a winner-takes-all situation. This contrasts with parliamentary systems where
the parliament is the sole elected institution and the government needs parliamentary
confidence (Linz 1990); and with semi-presidentialism where the president is directly
elected for a fixed term and a prime minister and a cabinet are collectively accountable
to the legislature (Elgie 2011). This means that, under parliamentary and semi-presidential
systems, cabinet survival requires negotiation with (and legitimation by) the parliament,
which can be particularly challenging in more fluid party systems.
3. Case selection and research strategy
The study employs a most similar systems research design incorporating four cases – Cabo
Verde, Comoros, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles – with many shared character-
istics. First, they are all small island states with less than 1 million inhabitants in relatively
homogeneous societies (Schaefer 2008; Ojo 2016). Second, insularity and small size
combine to make their economies more vulnerable than larger states (Briguglio et al.
2005). Third, they experienced authoritarianism from the start of independence until
the early 1990s. In Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles, the main anticolo-
nial movements – respectively, Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde (PAICV),
Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) and Seychelles People’s Progress-
ive Front (SPPF) – became the country’s sole directing force shortly after independence
(Fleischhacker 1999; Thibaut 1999b; Clemente-Kersten 1999). In the Comoros, there
were five small political parties when independence was announced, but the Union
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Comorienne pour le Progrès (UCP, or Udzima) managed to restrict other parties’ activities to
become the sole legal party (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2007, 205; Hassan 2009, 231).
Fourth, by the end of the 1980s the four islands embarked on liberalisation reforms in
response to the economic crisis, high levels of popular protest (Comoros), and pressures
from regime reformers (Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles) and the inter-
national community. Fifth, they hold elections regularly and have nominally democratic
political systems despite varying degrees of quality and of political stability.1 Comoros
and Seychelles are ranked electoral democracies by the Freedom House, while Cabo
Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe stand as liberal democracies. All have sufficient demo-
cratic credentials to enable the comparative study of their party systems (on this see Casal
Bértoa 2018; Mainwaring 2018). Despite their many similarities, the party systems in these
countries have unfolded in distinct ways. As later shown, patterns of interparty compe-
tition have been more stable in Cabo Verde and Seychelles than in São Tomé and Príncipe
and Comoros.
The purpose of this study is to trace the origins of these different trajectories through a
Small-N comparative design that allows the in-depth analysis of the institutional choices
made during the transition, and off their effects on party system development. By select-
ing most similar cases, other potential explanatory factors (e.g. social cleavages, economy,
authoritarian past), which are kept constant, can be discarded, while focusing on the vari-
able of interest (institutional choice).2 The study seeks not only to explore the character-
istics of individual cases but also to identify some regularities across cases, thus
contributing to the theories of party system development in Africa.
4. Party system stability in four small African islands
Three indicators are employed to characterise party system stability: electoral volatility,
seat volatility and alternation in power. Electoral volatility is the vote difference
between parties in successive elections divided by two (Pedersen 1983); the same logic
is applied to seat volatility. Alternation in power measures whether there has been whole-
sale, partial, or no-alternation in power (Mair 1996). Altogether these indicators measure
stability at the electoral, parliamentary and governing level. More refined measures
such as the degree of closure of party systems (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2016) were not
calculated due to lack data, and electoral volatility in the Comoros was not estimated
for the same reason.
Figures 1 and 2 display the selected indicators of stability, and show a broad range of
variation across countries and over time. Cabo Verde and Seychelles (particularly between
1998 and 2007) exhibit the lowest rates of volatility, and relatively closed structures of
competition.
In Seychelles, the structure of competition was predictable until 2016: the SPPF,
renamed Parti Lepep (PL) in 2009, won the majority of parliamentary seats in all polls,
with seat gains varying between 67.6% (in 2002 and 2007) and 97.1% (in 2011).
However, in 2016 the country witnessed the first ever alternation in power, with the
coalition Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) winning 57.6% of the seats vis-à-vis SPPF/PL’s
42.4%. Apart from LDS, only one other party gained parliamentary representation
between 1993–2016 – the Popular Democratic Movement (PDM) in 2011.
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Cabo Verde has a classical two-party system in which two parties have a more or
less equal chance of winning sufficient electoral support to gain an executive mon-
opoly. Unlike the Seychelles, alternation occurred in half of the elections (1991;
2001 and 2016). The PAICV and the Movimento para a Democracia (MpD) are the
Figure 1. Indicators of Party system stability: electoral volatility and Seat Volatility. Source: Author’s
elaboration.
Figure 2. Indicators of Party system stability: patterns of alternation in government. Source: Author’s
elaboration.
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most important parties in the system: together, they hold more than 95% of the seats
in parliament leaving only a narrow margin of eligibility to smaller parties. Both parties
have been able to form single-party cabinets with wide parliamentary support (PAICV
in 2001, 2006 and 2011; MpD in 1991, 1995 and 2016). So far, only three small parties
have reached parliament: the Partido da Convergência Democrática (PCD) in 1995, the
Partido Social Democrático (PSD) in 2001 and the União Caboverdiana Independente e
Democrática (UCID) in 2006.
São Tomé and Príncipe is a multiparty system comprising four relevant parties/
coalitions which succeeded each other in power: 1) the Partido de Convergência Democrá-
tica-Grupo de Reflexão (PCD-GR), winner of the founding multiparty elections in 1991, 2)
the MLSTP/PSD3, most voted party between 1994 and 2002; 3) the coalition betweenMovi-
mento Democrático das Forças da Mudança-Partido Liberal and PCD-GR (MDFM-PCD),
which won the 2006 elections; and finally 4) the Acção Democrática Independente (ADI)
most voted party in 2010, 2014 and 2018. Generally speaking, these parties are described
as personalistic vehicles for endorsing presidential candidates and the product of ‘faction-
ist struggles and personal rivalries’ (Seibert 2016, 3). Overall, Santomean elections are more
competitive and unpredictable and result in more fragmented parliaments and short lived
cabinets (Seibert 2016; Sanches 2017).
In Comoros, no single party has ever secured a majority following elections. Parties fre-
quently change labels, merge and split between elections. In 1992, Union des Démocrates
pour le Développement (UDD) received the largest share of seats (7 out 36) while 14 parties
and independents took the remaining seats. In 1993, the Rassemblement pour la Démocra-
tie et le Renouveau (RDR), a merger of several parties including the incumbent UDD, won
the qualified majority of seats but seven other parties still reached the parliament. In 1996,
the Rassemblement National pour le Développement (RND), established through the merger
of the incumbent RDR and several other parties, won almost all the parliamentary seats.
The Camp des Îles Autonomes (CdIA), an alliance including several parties and the
former ruling party RND, gained the most votes in 2004 but saw the Baobab Coalition,
which supported President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, win the 2009 elections. Finally, the alli-
ance between Union pour le Développement des Comores (UPDC) and the Parti Juwa (PJ)
won 33% and 29.2% of seats respectively in 2015.
Overall, these indicators point to higher levels of stability in Cabo Verde and, to some
extent, in Seychelles than in Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe. The former two are
characterised by lower levels of volatility in most elections, less permeability of new
parties, and fewer episodes of alternation in power. The following section explains
these different trajectories by focusing on the institutional choices made during the
transition.
5. The road to party system stability: exploring the impact of the choices
made during democratic transition
5.1. Cabo verde
Cabo Verde’s democratic transition was initiated by the regime but eventually involved a
pact between the elites of the authoritarian regime (PAICV) and the new opposition elites
(MpD). From 1985 and until the appearance of MpD in March 1990, the PAICV launched a
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series of reforms. This included the approval of a new electoral law that allowed indepen-
dent candidates to run in the 1985 elections, and the establishment of a broad reforming
agenda during the 1988 party congress held under the motto ‘A party for the future in a
changing world’. However, these reforms were unable to mitigate the pressures for politi-
cal opening, particularly when the MpD appeared on the scene. At that point, the PAICV
began a rapid process of liberalisation with the aim of gaining an advantage over the
opponents and preventing the MpD from becoming more organised; however, this
proved unsuccessful. The MpD emerged as a strong negotiator at this stage, and con-
ditioned the liberalisation agenda thanks to the PAICV’s overconfidence that it would
win the founding elections (Sanches 2017, 2018).
The party law (Law 86/1II/90) was published just three months before the January 1991
elections, which meant that political organisations had little time to submit their appli-
cation. Registering a party entailed meeting the following requirements: at least 500
members, 10 of whom had to reside in one of the country’s councils; founding consti-
tution, approved programmes and statutes, members’ criminal records and residency
terms (Article 6.1). The party law included bans on religious and local parties, rules for
funding on the basis of the number of legislators elected (Article 19), and it instituted
fiscal rights for parties acquiring at least 5% of the votes. The late approval of the law
and the strictness of the regulations eventually protected the PAICV and MpD from
further competition. In fact, two political parties operating outside of the country were
unable to meet the legal requirements in due time to participate in 1991
elections (Sanches 2017, 2018).4
The PAICV and MpD were also strategic about the choice of the electoral system for
the parliamentary elections (Law 81/III/90): both agreed on a PR system but had
different motivations. The PAICV was used to this formula, and changing it could
imply higher risks. The MpD did not expect to win the elections but only to get one
third of the seats (Sanches 2018). In theory, PR systems favour representation particu-
larly in larger electoral districts. However, the law stipulates that the majority of the
electoral districts (12 out of 19) elect fewer than 4 mandates; and this benefits the
major parties as they have more chance of getting the few potential seats. This
choice is instrumental and confirms the expectation that large parties often prefer dis-
tricts to be smaller in order to exclude others from competition (Colomer 2005, 3).
During the transition, the presidential elections were seen as a more influential deter-
minant of who would govern. The PAICV hoped to capitalise on the charisma of the
incumbent President Aristides Pereira5 by holding the presidential elections prior to
legislative elections; but the MpD wanted the opposite and eventually managed to
alter the election calendar accordingly.
Finally, the choice for the executive system was another source of contention. While
both PAICV and MpD agreed on a semi-presidential regime, they diverged on the
extent of presidential powers. The MpD preferred a ‘mitigated form of parliamentar-
ianism’ in which the prime minister and the parliament had greater powers regarding
cabinet formation and dismissal (Costa 2001). The underlying motivations were
clear: while PAICV expected to re-elect Aristides Pereira and wanted a stronger presi-
dent, the MpD still wanted to have a say as a parliamentarian force. However, the
decision on these rules was postponed until after the polls due to the lack of
agreement.
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5.2. Comoros
Since it gained independence, the Comoros has experienced continuous political instabil-
ity triggered by inter-island rivalries over the structure of the executive system and the
economic, fiscal and political autonomy of the islands (Hassan 2009; Baker 2008). Talks
for political liberalisation started after President Ahmed Abdallah’s assassination in 1989,
following a constitutional referendum that approved the extension of the presidential
term and reinstated the post of prime minister. Said Mohamed Djohar was subsequently
appointed interim President and stated his ‘willingness to enter into a pact of reconcilia-
tion with his opponents, on condition that they did not challenge the legitimacy of his
incumbency or attempt to destabilise the regime’ (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2007,
207). The opposition demanded the establishment of a ‘transitional government of
national unity and a round table for drafting the new constitution’ but these demands
were not met (Thibaut 1999a, 243–244).
Amid continuous political instability, Said Mohamed Djohar saw his vision and legiti-
macy to carry out the transition process sanctioned after he won the 1990 multiparty pre-
sidential elections. In 1991, domestic participants of the Opposition Union met former
presidential candidate Mohamed Taki in Paris to discuss the formation of an interim gov-
ernment and the organisation of a national conference. This conference, organised by
Djohar, lasted from January to April 1992 and involved over twenty political parties,
most of which were weak, centralised in the party leader and essentially regionalist
(Hassan 2009; Ali, Roubani, and Said 2011). The more polarising issues concerned
Udzima’s dominance and the fact that it mainly represented the interests of the island
of Anjouan. On the other hand, the Mohelians and most of the opposition parties
demanded more inter-island institutional equilibrium, namely delocalisation of ministries,
equitable distribution of high state functions at federal level, reinforcement of institutions
at the island-level and an equal share of the State budget (Mohamed 2001, 204; Mohadji
2005, 175). The conference produced a constitution draft which was approved by 75% of
the voters who participated in the June 7 referendum.
Unlike the other cases in this study, no party law was enacted. The 1992 Constitution
contained only minimal prescriptions intended to safeguard inter-island equilibria: ‘Politi-
cal parties (…) form and exercise their activity freely in respect of unity and national sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, democracy and balance between the islands’ (Article 4).
Although the Constitution called for the creation of a party law establishing the conditions
for parties to register and provisions for public funding (Article 4), this was only recently
enacted (in 2013). The successive constitutional revisions only provided minimal prescrip-
tions for party formation which were eased over the years.6 The permissiveness of the law
has meant the constant proliferation of political parties with a short life span.
The 1992 constitution had several innovations and many gains for the Mohelians with
regards the institutional equilibria. The new constitution replaced presidentialism with
semi-presidentialism, and instituted that the President could be elected for a maximum
of two 5-year terms. It created a new bicameral parliament (15 Senate seats and 42
National Assembly seats), governors for all three islands and local government or island
councils (Lucas 1992, 6; Mohamed 2001, 203–258). Members of the Senate (5 per island)
were to be indirectly elected by the electoral colleges set on each island while
Members of National Assembly were directly elected through plurality vote in single
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member districts. This means that the most voted candidate in each district wins the seat.
This decision is contrary to the expectation that, in a multiparty configuration, the parties
tend to prefer larger district magnitudes. In this case, the decision to keep the same
formula that had been in place since 1961 can be seen as a way of avoiding further uncer-
tainty in election outcomes.
5.3. São Tomé and Príncipe
Political reforms started from the mid-1980s in response to pressures from regime refor-
mers and economic turmoil (Branco and Varela 1998, 52). Under the leadership of
Manuel Pinto de Costa, the MLSTP launched the ‘Politics of Citizen Engagement’ aimed
at promoting the active participation of citizens and civil society in decision making pro-
cesses. The intended reforms opened deep divisions in the party’s central committee,
which Pinto de Costa sought to overcome by launching a national conference in 1989.
However, it was unclear how broad the conference should be and whether its decisions
were legally binding. It was finally decided – as Pinto da Costa wanted – that the confer-
ence participants would comprise members of the MLSTP in addition to individuals invited
by the President. The conference was being prepared by the Reflection Group (Grupo de
Reflexão – GR), which was made up mainly of regime reformers and counsellors to the Pre-
sident (Branco and Varela 1998, 66). The three days of congress (3-6 December) were
marked by open and direct conversation, the likes of which had never been seen in the
history of the country. The draft constitution was approved and then sanctioned in a con-
stitutional referendum in which the people voted overwhelmingly for multipartyism. At a
joint session on March 28 1990, the central committee of the MLSTP and the Popular
National Assembly unanimously approved the new democratic constitution (Seibert
1999, 176).
The party law (Law 8/90) was enacted in September 1990, four months before the 1991
parliamentary elections. Given the more open process of political transition, the party for-
mation process was easier than in Cabo Verde for instance. Legalising a party requires 250
signatures, programme, symbol and acronym (Article 9). But unlike Cabo Verde, residency
is not a requirement and the Supreme Court’s deliberation is issued within two weeks
(Article 9). Parties were given access to indirect and direct state funding and to fiscal
benefits to complement the funds collected via members’ fees and other activities
(Article 27). This law created conditions for the legalisation of three new political parties
ahead of the 1991 elections: PCD-GR (which absorbed the GR), CODO and FDC (Sanches
2017).
In the final phase of the transition process, these parties released a joint declaration in
which they accused the MLSTP/PSD of deliberately delaying the democratisation process.
They further denounced what they considered excessive centralisation of decision making
in the party and wanted to have a say in all decisions relevant for democratisation. More
specifically, they demanded the creation of a ‘National concerted council to discuss the
timetable of the elections and the electoral laws, as well as the replacement of the
people in charge of those state organs which might interfere in the political process,
such as the local media and the supreme court’ (Seibert 1999, 182).
The MLSTP-led conference maintained the PR electoral system for the parliamentary
elections and established that both parties and independent candidates could run in
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the elections. The PR formula is applied in multimember constituencies with five out of
seven districts electing more than five seats (Sanches 2017). These rules create stronger
incentives for newcomers and confirm the prediction that multiparty configurations will
tend to prefer PR and larger district magnitudes. As in Cabo Verde, the party elites
opted for a semi-presidential constitution but in which the President has stronger
powers in the areas of cabinet formation and dismissal (Seibert 2009). The reason why
the key political actors opted for this design lies to some extent in the very nature of pol-
itical transitions. In fact, the far reaching executive power of the president had been tailor-
made for Pinto da Costa, who was not content with mere representative functions. When
the constitution was being drafted, neither he nor his party had any doubt that he would
be the country’s first democratically elected president, but he eventually withdrew from
the elections (Seibert 1999, 177).
5.4. Seychelles
On 4 December 1991, President France-Albert René announced a return to the multiparty
system at an Extraordinary Congress of the SPPF, and the constitution was subsequently
amended to allow the registration of political parties (Seychelles Nation7). This decision
was the result of international pressure after René had passed a resolution in April 1991
stating that Seychelles would forever remain a one-party state (Baker 2008, 280).
The transition process involved the creation of a Constitutional Committee (CC) to draft
the new Constitution, a referendum on the draft Constitution and general elections (Com-
monwealth Secretariat 1992). Elections for the CC were held between 23 and 26 July 1992,
but only two out of eight competing parties exceeded the 5% threshold: the SPPF (58.4%,
14 representatives) and the DP (33.7%, 8 representatives). The CC began working on the
draft on 27 August but the two rival parties were unable to reach a consensus. DP del-
egates eventually abandoned the CC and joined six other parties to create the United
Opposition which campaigned for the ‘no’ vote on the grounds that they considered
the Constitution undemocratic. Their complaints included the limitation of candidacy to
presidential candidates, the absence of a limit on presidential terms, and the appointment
of members of the national assembly on the basis of the results of presidential elections.
The first referendum failed to pass with 53.7% voting in favour and 44.6% against. The CC
resumed work on 11 January 1993 to prepare a fresh draft, imbued with a new spirit of
cooperation and compromise with smaller political parties, churches and members of
the public taking part in the meetings. The consensus draft was agreed on 7 May 1993
and a referendum called for 15–18 June. Although several parties campaigned against
the draft, the DP and SPPF successfully campaigned for its approval, winning with
73.9% of the votes.
Some issues were resolved ahead of the 1993 Presidential and National elections. All
parties had accepted that the voters’ registration list was credible and as accurate as poss-
ible. The government had reassessed the question of funding of political parties and had
decided to allocate a fixed amount for this purpose to be divided among all parties taking
part in the elections, proportionate to the support each received in the July 1992 election
(Commonwealth Secretariat 1993). The party law (Political parties Registration and Regu-
lation Act -Cap. 173, Act 19 of 1991) stipulates that a political party must consist of no less
than 100 registered members. Party members must be over 17 and be a Seychelles citizen
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and resident (Article 5). Applications for registration must also include copies of the con-
stitution and rules of the party, information on its main office and other details required by
the Commissioner (Article 5). A party may be refused registration if the application does
not satisfy the terms of the Act, namely if their aims further discrimination on the
grounds of race, religion or colour, advocate violent or illegal political changes or the
secession of any part of the Republic (Article 7).
The new constitution reinstated a mixed legislative system (plurality and PR with Hare
quota) with 25 seats elected in single-member constituencies but with a maximum of 10
additional seats distributed among parties that receive more than 10% of the votes cast
(Poupko 2017, 330). This system was endorsed by the incumbent SPPF/PL for reasons
that seem both logical and strategic. First, plurality tends to produce absolute winners.
Candidates run in single-member constituencies and it is usually the largest dominant
party that takes the seat. Second, the 10% threshold further accentuates a winners-
take-all scenario as smaller parties may struggle to reach that mark.
As for the choice of the executive system, the SPPF/PL supported the outgoing presi-
dential system and the DP proposed a shift to semi-presidentialism. As the incumbent
party, the SPPF/PL’s preference was to maintain the institutional devices inherited from
the previous authoritarian regime. This position can be perceived as a way of minimising
the risks and uncertainties of an institutional shift. The presidential system was ultimately
chosen and validated in the 1993 constitutional referendum by 75% of the vote cast.
5.5. Institutional choices and pathways to party system development
The preceding analysis highlighted the different timings and dynamics of democratic tran-
sition in each country and the institutional choices made during this critical juncture (see
Table 1). In Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, initial liberalisation reforms were
launched in the mid-1980s as part of a strategic move by the incumbent authoritarian
elites – PAICV and MLSTP – to demobilise regime reformers. The PAICV controlled the
initial stages of the liberalisation agenda but the MpD eventually levelled the playing
field and participated in the institutional decision making leading to the first elections
Table 1. Transition modes and institutional choices.
Cabo Verde Comoros São Tomé and Príncipe Seychelles






















competed in the first
election
2 22 4 3
Nature of the institutions chosen during transition
Type of party law Restrictive Permissive Permissive Restrictive
Electoral system PR formula Plurality formula PR formula Mixed formula
Structure of executive
powers
Semipresidential Semipresidential Semipresidential Presidential
Source: Author’s elaboration. *CSOs = Civil Society Organisations. **The process became more participative after the first
draft of the constitution was rejected.
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in 1991. In São Tomé and Príncipe, the MLSTP, and particularly the incumbent President
Manuel Pinto da Costa centralised most decisions and used ad hoc solutions – a national
conference – to overcome internal dissidence, but the regime reformers managed to have
a say in the institutional choices. In the Comoros and the Seychelles, the most
signficant reforms were introduced in the early 1990s at a time of stronger pressure
from the international community, just a few years before the first multiparty elections
in 1992 and 1993 respectively. Under the leadership of René and the SPPF, the Seychellois
constitution was amended to allow party formation. Then the reforms were discussed in
an elected CC comprising members of the SPPF and the DP. Finally, in the Comoros the
incumbent President Said Mohamed Djohar, from the Udzima, called for the organisation
of a national conference, in which over twenty political parties participated. How did the
institutional decisions made at this point structured the competition over time?
More restrictive party laws were chosen in Cabo Verde and Seychelles where parties
were required to submit a more complete ‘dossier’ and appeared to be subject to
greater scrutiny. This is particularly so in the Seychelles where the law makes more fre-
quent mention of punitive mechanisms. It is easier to form political parties in the
Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe and the minimal regulations in the former entailed
a constant proliferation of parties and successive episodes of parties merging and disap-
pearing. This is further accentuated by the very nature of party formations, which are
largely personalistic and regionalist despite the fact that the constitution prohibits
regional, ethnic and religious parties (Article 7).
These different regulations had important effects on the structuring of party systems. In
Seychelles and Cabo Verde, they created higher barriers for party formation and shielded
the interests of those who negotiated the transition, whereas in the Comoros and São
Tomé and Príncipe they eased party proliferation. Party laws mattered during the tran-
sition and beyond as no significant change in the rules has been approved over time.
The exception is the Comoros, where a party law was finally passed in 2013 (Law No.
13010 AU) but the overall regulations remain non-restrictive.8
In terms of the electoral system, the uncertainty of political transition led both incum-
bent and newcomers to choose on the basis of their future odds – a share of seats or an
absolute win. The PR formula in Cabo Verde is applied mostly in small-size constituencies
that elect a maximum of four seats on average and it therefore ends up favouring the
larger parties against newcomers. The same can be said about Seychelles’ mixed
formula that elects 75% of the parliamentary seats in single member constituencies and
includes a 10% election threshold. This benefits the larger and established parties: the
MpD and the PAICV in Cabo Verde, and the SPPF/PL in the Seychelles. Recent changes
in the electoral law in Cabo Verde (in 2010) only accentuated the dominance of the two
main parties. In fact, the creation of island-level electoral districts forces smaller parties
to invest in nationwide organisations; this is costly and likely to favour the country’s
only two nationwide parties: PAICV and MpD. In the Comoros, the continuous political
instability made interparty competition highly centrifugal. Contrary to Seychelles where
plurality leads to higher levels of stability, in the Comoros the same formula exacerbates
an endemic polarisation driven by inter-island contentions on the structure of the federal
state and the extent of presidential powers. Indeed, plurality formulas fail to produce
reductive effects on a national scale if there is great subnational or cross-constituency dis-
persion of issues which cannot be represented by two major parties (Sartori 2003). In São
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Tomé and Príncipe, the choice of a PR system in a context of multiple competing parties
was instrumental to the immediate alternation in power and in future elections.
In terms of executive system, all countries opted for semi-presidentialism except the
Seychelles which remained presidential. This was an important victory for incumbent Pre-
sident René and his SPPF over the DP, the main negotiating partner; and structured the
competition over time. After winning the founding general elections, the SPPF remained
the dominant party in successive polls controlling the presidency and the legislature sim-
ultaneously. Change only came recently with the SPPF electing the president in 2015 and
LDS winning the 2016 parliamentary elections. In Cabo Verde, the party elites disagreed on
the extent of presidential powers but they eventually committed to a semi-presidential
constitution. One year after the 1991 polls, a constitutional amendment was approved
to reduce the presidential power to dissolve parliament and dismiss the cabinet and
also to balance the relation between the President and Prime Minister (Neto Octavio
and Lobo 2014, 446). Over time the PAICV and MpD have been able to form single-
party cabinets with wide parliamentary support. There have been successive episodes
of unified government since the founding multiparty elections. The only episode of coha-
bitation was between 2011 and 2016 when the PAICV had a parliamentary majority with
the MpD in the presidency.
Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe also opted for semi-presidentialism, but with a
constitutionally stronger president in the areas of cabinet formation and dismissal. The
reasons behind this choice lie in the very nature of each country’s political transition.
Both these countries experienced more polarised transition processes during which
several new political parties emerged. Whereas the founding multiparty elections in
Cabo Verde and Seychelles were contested by very few parties, more parties went to
the polls and gained representation in São Tomé and Príncipe and Comoros. Conse-
quently, partial alternation in power and coalition cabinets have been more frequent in
these two cases. The option for a strong president can thus be seen as a way of overcom-
ing governing instability.9
In sum, more stable party systems emerged in Cabo Verde and Seychelles where the
elites managed to control the transition and select the most favourable intuitions.
Higher levels of stability have been sustained by more restrictive party laws, electoral
laws that benefit the larger parties, and more stable intra-executive relations. In contrast,
Comoros and São Tomé and Príncipe have less stable party systems. The party laws are
more permissive, the electoral formulas encourage representation of smaller parties,
and the choice for stronger presidents in a context with multiple competing parties has
further exacerbated political instability.
6. Conclusion
Focusing on the political experiences of four small African islands – Cabo Verde, Comoros
São Tomé and Príncipe and Seychelles – this article has explored the ways in which insti-
tutional choices made during the democratic transition influenced different trajectories of
party system development. The selection of four similar cases sought to control rival expla-
nations, and to isolate the variable of interest (institutional choice). The in-depth analysis
began by tracing the choices made during transition, a critical juncture of institutional
crafting, and then related those choices with the different pathways of party systems
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stability. It thus aimed to provide a link between institutional choices and their conse-
quences by highlighting the role of agency and strategic decisions of party elites to
reduce electoral uncertainty.
Overall, two main findings merit highlight. First, as elsewhere across the continent,
party systems in these four cases vary substantially in their degree of stabilisation.
Across successive rounds of elections, Cabo Verde and Seychelles have experienced
fewer episodes of alternation in power and of high volatility than Comoros and São
Tomé and Príncipe. Secondly, strategic choices of party laws, electoral laws and executive
systems helped structure the political competition beyond the critical juncture of demo-
cratic transition. In Cabo Verde and Seychelles, the transition negotiators kept the electoral
rules that imposed greater constraints on newcomers and adopted party laws that were
more protective of their interests. Moreover, the definition of presidential powers envi-
saged the goal of cabinet stability. Over the years, there has been little change in these
institutional rules, thus underlining their critical impact on the prospects of stabilisation.
In the Comoros and in São Tomé and Príncipe, the transition was held under the auspices
of national conferences which could be attended by different political groups, individuals,
and even civil society organisations, particularly in the case of Comoros. The electoral rules
and the more flexible party laws introduced at this stage contributed to a constant prolifer-
ation of parties, most of which personalistic (but also regionalist as the case of Comoros
illustrates). In these two cases, the president is often the ‘tie breaker’, which makes presi-
dential elections vital for cabinet survival. The nascent party systems in Comoros and in
São Tomé and Príncipe ended up being more open, with more rotation in power and
more unpredictable results.
The key lesson to be drawn from this comparative exercise is that successful stabilis-
ation depends on the party elites’ ability to craft institutional rules that can protect
them from uncertainty in future interactions. Institutional rules are not neutral; they can
decide the number of parties that are durable and have a chance of forming government.
Once these rules are in place, parties are unwilling to change them and the cases herein
demonstrate the high cost of institutional change for party elites (only Comoros and São
Tomé and Príncipe made significant changes, and these addressed the executive system).
This study contributes to the literature on party system development in Africa in two direc-
tions. On the one hand, it highlights the relevance of democratic transitions. While most
studies have convincingly demonstrated the relevance of authoritarian legacies for party
system development, it remains unclear which decisions were made during the transition
and how this structured the competition over time. On the other hand, it shows that
agency matters during the transition and beyond because, once in place, the institutional
rules tend to be preserved in continuous rounds of elections. Future work is needed to
clarify the nature of regime transitions in Africa and their long term impacts in political
competition; and to explore the role of party agency in reducing uncertainty in future elec-
tions. To the extent that this discussion can be extrapolated to the democratisation
debate, it suggests that party agency is crucial for democratic development.
Notes
1. For instance, since 1991, São Tomé and Príncipe has experienced several episodes of cabinet
dismissal and two military coups (1995, 2003). Since 1993, Comoros has recorded six coups or
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plots against the government (1995, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2013) and has faced secessionist
threats from the Mohéli Island.
2. However, this kind of methodological design tends to produce deterministic assumptions. For
further discussions see Frendreis (1983) and Lieberson (1991).
3. The MLSTP renamed MLSTP/Partido Social Democrata in 1990.
4. The União dos Povos das Ilhas de Cabo Verde (UPICV) based in Senegal, and União Cabo-Verdi-
ana Independente e Democrata (UCID) active in the United States and the Netherlands.
5. This view has been conveyed by political elites of both parties, interviewed during field work
in January.
6. For example, under Article 5 of the 1996 constitution (http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/km1996.
htm), a party could be dissolved if it failed to elect two candidates per island but this require-
ment was removed in the 2001 revision (http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/km2001.htm).
7. Chronology of events available at: http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=254530 (accessed on
15/06/2018).
8. Registering requires a minimum of 20 signatures in each constituency and a dossier including
a statement from one of the founding members, founding constitutions, members’ details,
party name, symbol and address. The reply is communicated immediately or via mail within
two months (Chapter I).
9. In Comoros the president’s powers have been increased in successive constitutional revisions
(2001 and 2009) while in São Tomé and Príncipe they were curtailed in 2003, (Seibert 2016). In
both cases politics remains more unpredictable than in the other cases.
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